管理工程学报2026，Vol.40Issue(3)：98-109,12.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2026.03.008
CVC还是IVC:基于行为博弈的初创科技型企业融资选择
CVC or IVC:Financing choice of startup technology enterprises based on behavioral game
摘要
Abstract
Startup technology enterprises are an important carrier and backbone of China's science and technology self-reliance strategy.Startup technology enterprises with strong market competitiveness and good development prospects have a strong attraction for venture capital(VC)institutions and access to this financing option.However,startup technology enterprises that require continuous research and development or industrialization tests confront multiple difficulties concerning huge gaps in capital investment and insufficient scientific and technological innovation and operation management capabilities,with an urgent need for VC institutions to provide funds and professional value-added services. Comparing the two mainstream VC institutions,namely corporate VC(CVC)and independent VC(IVC),we focus on the impact of differences such as VC institutions' investment objectives,resource characteristics,behavioral decisions on startup technology enterprises' financing choice,which has not been explicitly investigated in previous studies.We consider the enabling effect(the tangible and intangible assets with which VC institutions may increase startups' value)and the governance effect(the positive or negative impact of VC institutions' behavioral decisions,as shareholders,on startups' resource allocation),interpret the characteristics of CVC and IVC institutions,and establish a two-stage moral hazard model for financing startup technology enterprises based on a behavioral game.The study comprehensively analyzes the influence of VC's enabling and governance effects on startup technology enterprises' financing choices. We divide the cooperation between a startup technology enterprise and VC institutions into four stages,including selecting a VC institution,investing efforts into the project,project success or failure,and profit distribution.The investment effort stage prior to project success and the profit distribution stage following project success may encounter bilateral moral hazard issues.We assume that CVC can produce a stronger enabling effect than IVC,but due to CVC's strategic pursuit,it cannot produce a governance effect,whereas IVC can produce different degrees of governance effect through relationship-building capabilities.We analyze whether both parties will choose opportunistic behaviors through a behavioral game model.If both parties do not choose opportunistic behaviors,all benefits can be achieved.When one or both parties choose opportunistic actions,it will result in the loss of real benefits.Based on the expectation of the other party's behavior,both parties consider the actual benefits that could be realized,and decide the level of effort input to maximize utility.Based on the comprehensive influence of moral hazard in the two stages,determine the basis of a startup technology enterprise's financing choice,and the enterprise value and total net utility that is possible under three different scenarios of cooperation with CVC and IVC institutions. The study reveals that when the governance effect provided by IVC is insufficient,startup technology enterprises will choose CVC which can have a higher enabling effect because of increased moral hazard.IVC can change this choice by improving the governance effect to reduce moral hazard.An appropriate level of governance effect can enhance both parties' cooperative efficiency,subsequently resulting in higher enterprise value.In contrast,an excessively high governance effect may lead to an overestimation of the actual enterprise value created by both parties,which is not an optimal choice for startup technology enterprises.We also reveal ways for the two different types of VC institutions to enhance their attractiveness.For instance,IVC can provide more complementary assets to improve their enabling effect,and CVC should build good relationships with startup technology enterprises and cooperate at a higher level to enhance the governance effect.From the perspective of policy formulation,the study also proposes continuous improvement of relevant legal systems,strengthening market supervision,establishing smoother communication and interaction channels for social relations networks,designing a more transparent information disclosure mechanism,and enhancing the overall atmosphere of societal trust.This study provides a theoretical basis and practical guidance for promoting China's strategy of scientific and technological self-reliance and improving the financial support system for science and technology innovation.关键词
企业风险投资/独立风险投资/初创科技型企业/行为博弈/融资选择Key words
Corporate venture capital/Independent venture capital/Startup technology enterprises/Behavioral game/Financing choice分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
关皓云,郭菊娥,李彦昭..CVC还是IVC:基于行为博弈的初创科技型企业融资选择[J].管理工程学报,2026,40(3):98-109,12.基金项目
国家社科基金重点项目(23AZD037) （23AZD037）
陕西科控金融服务平台建设与示范(2019ZDLGY11-03) The Key Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China(23AZD037) （2019ZDLGY11-03）
The Construction and Demonstration of Shaanxi Science and Technology Holding Group Financial Service Platform(2019ZDLGY11-03) （2019ZDLGY11-03）
