情报杂志2026，Vol.45Issue(6)：37-46,10.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-1965.2026.06.006
反竞争情报驱动下深度伪造的拒止演化博弈研究
An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Deepfake Denial Driven by Anti-Competitive Intelligence
摘要
Abstract
[Purpose]Confronted with the dual challenges of trust crises among competing enterprises triggered by deepfakes and the lag-ging traditional defense mechanisms,this paper establishes a novel active denial paradigm based on counter-competitive intelligence,offer-ing forward-looking strategic guidance for enterprises to disrupt attack chains at their source and reconstruct commercial security immune barriers in the indistinguishable truth from falsehood digital game.[Method]Utilizing evolutionary game theory from the perspective of counter-competitive intelligence,a game framework comprising enterprises,forgers,and regulatory bodies is constructed to examine their strategic behaviors in the context of deepfakes.By assessing the payoffs,costs,and losses associated with different behavioral strategies,the payoff matrices for the three parties are calculated,and then evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed,and the findings are substantiat-ed through numerical simulations.[Result/Conclusion]The research findings indicate that enterprises and regulatory agencies can jointly promote the evolution of anti-competitive intelligence-driven systems towards a mature stage by adopting proactive defense and strengthe-ning regulatory strategies,thereby forming a stable dynamic deterrence system.The improvement in the success rate of technical defense can significantly encourage enterprises to adopt proactive defense strategies.The imposition of two-way penalty constraints by regulatory agencies on both forgers and enterprises is a driving factor for achieving effective deterrence of deepfake content.关键词
反竞争情报/深度伪造/拒止/三方演化博弈/积极防御/仿真分析Key words
anti-competitive intelligence/deepfakes/denial/tripartite evolutionary game/active defense/simulated analysis分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
高国伟,林俞帆..反竞争情报驱动下深度伪造的拒止演化博弈研究[J].情报杂志,2026,45(6):37-46,10.基金项目
辽宁省社会科学规划项目"政府与公民间政务数据可信性争议现象的发生机制与化解路径研究"(编号:L25BTQ002)研究成果. （编号:L25BTQ002）
