职业技术教育2026，Vol.47Issue(18)：43-51,9.
产教融合的"制度性利益陷阱"及其破解
The"Institutional Interest Trap"of Industry-education Integration and Its Resolution
摘要
Abstract
The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee have made strategic deployments for industry-education integration.However,school-enterprise cooperation faces an"institutional interest trap",characterized by the dual dilemma of ambiguous property rights and imbalanced risk distribution.From a game-theoretic perspective,this study constructs a game model of interests in school-enterprise cooperation,deconstructing the trap from the dimensions of property rights definition,risk sharing and game imbalance,and analyzing its composite drivers,including institutional lag,information asymmetry,market mechanism failure,and governance system imbalance.Accordingly,it is necessary to establish a property rights institutional supply system for long-term game equilibrium,innovate risk governance pathways for long-term game equilibrium,reform the benefit distribution mechanism for long-term game equilibrium,and build an incentive-constraint mechanism for long-term game equilibrium.关键词
产教融合/制度性利益陷阱/产权界定/风险分担/博弈论模型Key words
industry-education integration/institutional interest trap/property rights definition/risk sharing/game-theoretic model分类
社会科学引用本文复制引用
李群..产教融合的"制度性利益陷阱"及其破解[J].职业技术教育,2026,47(18):43-51,9.基金项目
2025年度河南省高校人文社会科学研究项目"主流媒体短视频融入大学思想政治教育研究"(2025-ZDJH-165),主持人:李群 （2025-ZDJH-165）
2024年度河南省高等教育教学改革研究与实践项目"职业院校高质量职业生涯发展教育教学改革实践研究——以济源职业技术学院为例"(2024SJGLX1087),主持人:雷玉梅 （2024SJGLX1087）
