重庆理工大学学报2026，Vol.40Issue(10)：25-38,14.DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1674-8425(s).2026.05.004
耐心资本与高管机会主义减持
Patient capital and opportunistic reduction of executive holdings
宋蔚蔚 1田美英1
作者信息
- 1. 重庆理工大学 会计学院,重庆 400054
- 折叠
摘要
Abstract
Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2023,this paper explores the influence and mechanism of patient capital on the opportunistic share reduction by senior executives.The study finds that patient capital can significantly inhibit the opportunistic share reduction behavior of executives,and this conclusion still holds after a series of robustness tests.Mechanism research indicates that patient capital can alleviate information asymmetry and enhance the internal governance of companies,thereby curbing opportunistic share reduction by senior executives.The research conclusion not only provides direct evidence for the governance effect of patient capital,but also offers significant implications for regulating the share reduction behavior of senior executives and promoting the high-quality development of the capital market.关键词
资本市场/耐心资本/高管减持/信息不对称Key words
capital market/patient capital/executives'opportunistic share reduction/information asym-metry分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
宋蔚蔚,田美英..耐心资本与高管机会主义减持[J].重庆理工大学学报,2026,40(10):25-38,14.
