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年报语调与管理层超额薪酬:能力嘉奖还是预期操纵

张家轩 李化龙

证券市场导报Issue(8):26-36,11.
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证券市场导报Issue(8):26-36,11.

年报语调与管理层超额薪酬:能力嘉奖还是预期操纵

张家轩 1李化龙2

作者信息

  • 1. 中国财政科学研究院,北京 100142
  • 2. 首都经济贸易大学博士后流动站,北京 100070||中国民航信息网络股份有限公司博士后科研工作站,北京 101318
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

The emotional tone of the Management Discussion and Analysis(MD&A)section in annual reports may reflect management's operational capabilities and confidence in the enterprise's future development,but it may also become a tool for management impression management and improving compensation assessments.Using a sample of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies,this paper finds that the more positive the annual report tone,the higher the future excess compensation for the management,and this relationship is more significant in enterprises audited by the Big Four accounting firms and with lower market competition levels.Mechanism identification reveals that the impact of annual report tone on managerial excess compensation mainly stems from management's expectation manipulation rather than a reward for managerial ability.First,corporate operating performance does not strengthen the positive relationship between annual report tone and managerial excess compensation.Second,an abnormally positive annual report tone beyond fundamental support has explanatory power for managerial excess compensation.Third,the four-quadrant grouping results based on operating performance and abnormally positive tone show that the impact of annual report tone on managerial excess compensation mainly occurs in enterprises with poor performance and an abnormally positive tone.Economic consequence analysis indicates that the compensation effect of positive annual report tone reduces management's pay-performance sensitivity,exacerbates enterprise underinvestment,and lowers the enterprise's future operating performance.This paper reveals the role of non-financial textual information in executive compensation contracts,providing a reference for improving the information screening mechanism of compensation committees and strengthening the regulation of textual information disclosure.

关键词

管理层讨论与分析/信息披露/超额薪酬/能力嘉奖/预期操纵

Key words

MD&A/information disclosure/excess compensation/ability reward/expectation manipulation

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

张家轩,李化龙..年报语调与管理层超额薪酬:能力嘉奖还是预期操纵[J].证券市场导报,2026,(8):26-36,11.

基金项目

国家社会科学基金项目"新时代国有经济布局优化和结构调整研究"(23STA017) (23STA017)

证券市场导报

OACHSSCD

1005-1589

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