摘要
Abstract
Motivated by the insufficient understanding of how policy uncertainty affects decision-making and welfare outcomes in energy supply chains,this study investigates the vertical transmission mechanism of policy costs within the supply chains,coordination contract arrangements,and the social welfare implications.A two-echelon energy supply chain model is developed based on an upstream-led Stackelberg game framework.By incorporating a mean-variance utility function,policy impacts are decomposed into expected policy costs and policy uncertainty.The results show that,increases in both expected policy costs and policy uncertainty suppress terminal market transactions and reduce the risk-adjusted returns of both upstream and downstream supply chain members.The impact of expected policy costs on the wholesale market depends on the patterns of policy exposure among upstream and downstream firms,thereby revealing the underlying mechan-ism through which policy shocks generate heterogeneous effects in the energy sector.An increase in policy uncertainty is transmitted within the supply chain through contract adjustment and price channels.When upstream firms face higher exposure to policy risks,wholesale prices increase accordingly.Further analysis demonstrates that market-based instruments,such as two-part tariff contracts,can effectively coordinate the risk-adjusted returns of supply chain members but cannot necessarily achieve risk-adjusted social welfare optimization,indicating a divergence between supply chain profit coordina-tion and social welfare coordination.The findings reveal the transmission mechanisms and welfare effects of policy uncer-tainty in energy supply chains,providing theoretical implications and decision-making insights for energy market governance,risk management,and policy optimization.关键词
能源供应链/主从博弈/政策不确定性/风险调整收益/两部收费协调契约Key words
energy supply chain/Stackelberg game/policy uncertainty/risk-adjusted returns/two-part tariff contract分类
能源科技
