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《联合国防治荒漠化公约》履约博弈分析:基于资金视角

李昊阳 刘帅飞 高广磊 丁国栋 赵媛媛 于明含 张英 许杨

北京大学学报(自然科学版)2026,Vol.62Issue(5):1127-1140,14.
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北京大学学报(自然科学版)2026,Vol.62Issue(5):1127-1140,14.DOI:10.13209/j.0479-8023.2026.090

《联合国防治荒漠化公约》履约博弈分析:基于资金视角

Compliance Game in the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification:A View of Funding

李昊阳 1刘帅飞 1高广磊 2丁国栋 3赵媛媛 3于明含 3张英 3许杨1

作者信息

  • 1. 北京林业大学水土保持学院,北京 100083
  • 2. 北京林业大学水土保持学院,北京 100083||林木资源高效生产全国重点实验室,北京 100083||中蒙荒漠化防治合作中心,北京 100083||林业生态工程教育部工程研究中心,北京 100083
  • 3. 北京林业大学水土保持学院,北京 100083||中蒙荒漠化防治合作中心,北京 100083||林业生态工程教育部工程研究中心,北京 100083
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Against the backdrop of funding challenges in the implementation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification(UNCCD),to conduct an in-depth analysis of the financial game dynamics between deve-loped and developing countries and explore effective pathways for optimizing financial cooperation mechanisms,this study draws upon the"Global Public Goods"theory and the principle of"Common but Differentiated Respon-sibilities",employing a combined methodological approach of comparative case analysis,static evolutionary game modeling,and numerical simulation analysis.It systematically examines the financial game dynamics,dissects the financial interaction mechanisms,and verifies the stability of game equilibria and their evolutionary pathways.The results indicate that national interests and international public opinion pressure are core factors affecting strategic choices.Developed countries choose"active cooperation"or"passive cooperation"in financial aid based on their interests and public pressure,while developing countries choose between"action"and"inaction"based on public pressure.The higher a developed country's international reputation and environmental benefits,the more likely it is to"actively cooperate".The greater the international reputational loss a developing country incurs,the more it is spurred to"act".Developed and developing countries need to find a long-term stable equilibrium in funding games to realize rational allocation and efficient utilization of resources.This research offers a theoretical basis for targeted desertification funding policies and contributes to advancing global desertification governance.

关键词

荒漠化防治/资金博弈/国际合作/演化博弈/《联合国防治荒漠化公约》

Key words

desertification control/funding game/international cooperation/evolutionary game/United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification(UNCCD)

引用本文复制引用

李昊阳,刘帅飞,高广磊,丁国栋,赵媛媛,于明含,张英,许杨..《联合国防治荒漠化公约》履约博弈分析:基于资金视角[J].北京大学学报(自然科学版),2026,62(5):1127-1140,14.

基金项目

新疆维吾尔自治区"天山英才"培养计划"精准治沙科技创新团队"项目(2024TSYCTD0009)、国家林业和草原局委托项目"国际干旱韧性问题发展应对策略研究"资助 (2024TSYCTD0009)

北京大学学报(自然科学版)

0479-8023

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