管理工程学报2026，Vol.40Issue(5)：122-137,16.DOI:10.13587/j.cnki.jieem.2026.05.009
财务报告问询函对非金融企业影子银行化治理研究
Research on the governance effect of financial report inquiry letters on shadow banking activities of non-financial enterprises
摘要
Abstract
In recent years,driven by profit-seeking motives,some non-financial enterprises have acted as financial intermediaries by participating in re-lending activities in the credit market through direct or indirect means.Characterized by high risks,such shadow banking activities significantly hinder their long-term development and threaten the stability of the financial system,thus making urgent governance imperative.The financial report inquiry letter is an innovative regulatory measure in China's securities market.Stock exchanges can issue inquiry letters to listed companies regarding matters where the information disclosed in their financial reports is incomplete,inaccurate,or raises doubts,and require the recipient companies to provide supplementary explanations.Existing literature has confirmed that inquiry letters have a significant impact on the recipient companies in terms of market response,information disclosure,and corporate governance.However,the governance effect and internal mechanism of financial report inquiry letters on shadow banking activities of non-financial enterprises still lack clear conclusions. Theoretically,financial report inquiry letters can curb the shadow banking activities of non-financial enterprises.First,financial report inquiry letters can enhance information transparency of recipient companies,alleviate the problem of information asymmetry,and thereby impose constraints on their shadow banking activities.Corporate shadow banking activities are difficult to identify and regulate through traditional methods.However,relevant evidence can be obtained by analyzing the financial report data based on financial theories.Therefore,financial report inquiry letters can incorporate shadow banking activities into the regulatory scope,thereby exerting governance effect.Second,financial report inquiry letters can mitigate agency conflicts and improve internal monitoring.Shadow banking activities are primarily driven by arbitrage motives,resulting in substantial harm to the real economy.Financial report inquiry letters can accurately identify corporate risks,expose information that the management may conceal or ambiguously disclose in financial reports,enable shareholders to comprehensively assess corporate operations,and restrain the management from engaging in shadow banking activities.Finally,financial report inquiry letters can draw the attention of external stakeholders and strengthen external monitoring,thereby restraining shadow banking activities. Based on the above analysis,this study takes Chinese A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2015 to 2021 as the research sample to examine the governance effect of financial report inquiry letters on shadow banking activities of non-financial enterprises.The research conclusions and academic contributions are as follows.First,financial report inquiry letters can significantly curb the shadow banking activities of non-financial enterprises.This finding not only provides a new approach for addressing the issue of shadow banking activities but also offers evidence for verifying the effectiveness of the financial report inquiry letter in governance.Second,the results of the mechanism tests indicate that financial report inquiry letters curb shadow banking activities of non-financial enterprises by intensifying their financing constraints and reducing the shareholdings of institutional investors.Third,performance fluctuations and core business profitability are key influencing factors for shadow banking activities.Cross-sectional tests show that when the performance fluctuates substantially,influenced by the high-risk nature of shadow banking activities and the managerial defense hypothesis,the management tends to retain sufficient funds to cope with operational risks,thereby reducing the scale of shadow banking activities.In this case,the governance effect of financial report inquiry letters is weakened.When the core business profitability is weaker,due to the substitution relationship between operating and financial assets,management has a greater incentive to engage in shadow banking activities,and the governance effect is more significant.In addition,analyst coverage strengthens external monitoring,further enhancing the inhibitory effect of financial report inquiry letters on shadow banking activities.Finally,further analysis reveals that the governance effect of financial report inquiry letters on shadow banking activities is short-term,and exhibits spillover effects on companies sharing the same audit firm with the recipient companies,especially those audited by non-top ten audit firms.This conclusion provides implications for the regulatory practice of inquiry letters and offers new evidence on the spillover effects from an audit connection perspective. This research enriches the literature on securities exchange regulation,provides evidence for curbing the shadow banking activities that lead non-financial enterprises to"shift from real to virtual economy",and offers practical insights.Stock exchanges should strengthen the rigor and precision of regulatory inquiries,enhance follow-up supervision of recipient companies,expand the regulatory coverage of peer enterprises,and reinforce regulatory deterrence.At the market level,external governance environments should be optimized to create a favorable institutional atmosphere.Enterprises should adhere to sustainable development,enhance the competitiveness of core businesses,stabilize profitability,and impose constraints on shadow banking activities at the source.关键词
财务报告问询函/影子银行化/治理效应/溢出效应Key words
Financial report inquiry letter/Shadow banking/Governance effect/Spillover effect分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
孙世敏,王雅文,王永恒..财务报告问询函对非金融企业影子银行化治理研究[J].管理工程学报,2026,40(5):122-137,16.基金项目
国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL017) The National Social Science Foundation of China(21BGL017) （21BGL017）
