荆楚理工学院学报2026，Vol.41Issue(4)：41-56,16.
新任独董更易加剧高管违规吗
Do New Independent Directors Tend to Exacerbate executive Violations?
摘要
Abstract
The supervision of independent directors is a core component of corporate governance structure,and the indepen-dence,professionalism,and objectivity of new independent directors play an irreplaceable role.This study selects data from A-share listed companies in China from 2011 to 2023,and explores the impact of new independent directors on executive violations by establishing Probit and OLS models.The results show that:new independent directors increase the likelihood of executive viola-tions;new independent directors enhance the possibility of executive violations by reducing corporate information transparency and decreasing the number of dissent votes;when new independent directors have a legal background and are not overburdened,they are more likely to reduce the risk of executive violations.Based on this,enterprises should strengthen information transparency,im-prove governance structures,and incentivize the initiative of new independent directors in their roles.关键词
新任独董/高管违规/信息透明度/薪酬激励Key words
new independent directors/executive violations/information transparency/compensation incentives分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈高才,王涵瑜..新任独董更易加剧高管违规吗[J].荆楚理工学院学报,2026,41(4):41-56,16.基金项目
安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目研究成果全周期视域下公司新任独董的选任、履职和治理效果研究(项目批准号:AHSKYY2024D010) （项目批准号:AHSKYY2024D010）
