荆楚理工学院学报2026，Vol.41Issue(4)：68-79,12.
政府奖惩下ESG披露履责与寻租的三方演化博弈:基于物流行业的研究
Tripartite Evolutionary Game of ESG Disclosure,Responsibility Fulfillment,and Rent-Seeking under Government Incentives and Sanctions:A Study Based on the Logistics Industry
摘要
Abstract
Under the"dual-carbon"goal and the promotion of sustainable development governance,ESG disclosure has be-come an important basis for measuring the green development of enterprises.At the stage when the system is not yet sound,logistics service providers face the pressure of responsibility fulfillment and compliance cost trade-off,and some enterprises seek rent to ob-tain inflated ratings,which interferes with the governance order.This paper focuses on the three parties:logistics service suppliers,ESG rating agencies,and the government,constructs a"green transportation-rating rent-seeking-policy regulation"evolutionary game model,analyzes the strategy evolution path and system stability based on limited rationality and information asymmetry,and conducts numerical simulation using Matlab.The results show that moderate incentives and penalties help guide compliance behav-ior and promote the evolution of the system to an ideal equilibrium,while excessive incentives may cause disturbances.The strate-gies of each party are constrained by net benefits and regulatory costs,and the incentive mechanism and cost-benefit structure should be optimized to provide a theoretical basis for improving the ESG governance system and enhancing the effectiveness of green governance.关键词
ESG信息披露/演化博弈/绿色治理/寻租行为/制度设计Key words
ESG disclosure/evolutionary game/green governance/rent-seeking behavior/institutional design分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
张瀚文,陈穆,孙华阳..政府奖惩下ESG披露履责与寻租的三方演化博弈:基于物流行业的研究[J].荆楚理工学院学报,2026,41(4):68-79,12.基金项目
辽宁省科学技术协会创新智库项目(LNKX2025QN33) （LNKX2025QN33）
