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多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的影响及其作用机制

吴成颂 王小丫

沈阳大学学报(社会科学版)2026,Vol.28Issue(4):1-14,14.
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沈阳大学学报(社会科学版)2026,Vol.28Issue(4):1-14,14.

多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的影响及其作用机制

Impact of Coexistence of Multiple Large Shareholders on Systemic Risk of Commercial Banks and Its Mechanism

吴成颂 1王小丫1

作者信息

  • 1. 安徽大学 商学院,安徽 合肥 230601
  • 折叠

摘要

Abstract

Chinese commercial banks from 2010 to 2023 were taken as research objects,and a two-way fixed effects model was employed to empirically examine the impact of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on commercial banks' systemic risk and its underlying mechanism.It was found that the coexistence of multiple large shareholders significantly increased the systemic risk of commercial banks.Mechanism tests revealed that the coexistence of multiple large shareholders elevated systemic risk mainly through two channels:enhancing monitoring intensity by other large shareholders and reducing bank liquidity.Moderating effect tests indicated that a higher intensity of macroprudential policies weakened the positive impact of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on commercial banks' systemic risk.Heterogeneity analysis showed that the positive effect of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on commercial banks' systemic risk was more pronounced in non-systemically important banks,large-scale banks,and banks operating in less competitive markets.Based on these findings,recommendations were proposed,including strengthening internal governance and supervision of banks with diversified ownership structures,optimizing liquidity management and risk prevention and control,leveraging the moderating role of macroprudential policies,and promoting differentiated supervision and targeted policy implementation so as to prevent systemic risk in commercial banks and enhance the stability of the banking system.

关键词

多个大股东并存/商业银行系统性风险/大股东监督/流动性水平/宏观审慎政策

Key words

coexistence of multiple large shareholders/commercial banks' systemic risk/large shareholder supervision/liquidity level/macroprudential policy

分类

管理科学

引用本文复制引用

吴成颂,王小丫..多个大股东并存对商业银行系统性风险的影响及其作用机制[J].沈阳大学学报(社会科学版),2026,28(4):1-14,14.

基金项目

国家社会科学基金资助项目(24BGL061). (24BGL061)

沈阳大学学报(社会科学版)

OACHSSCD

2095-5464

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