沈阳大学学报（社会科学版）2026，Vol.28Issue(4)：15-23,9.
家庭农场雇工合约的缔结成本、履约风险与治理策略
Transaction Costs,Contract Performance Risks,and Governance Strategies of Employment Contracts in Family Farms
摘要
Abstract
From the perspective of contract economics,the composition of transaction costs,types of risks,and differentiated governance mechanisms of employment contracts in Chinese family farms were systematically analyzed.It was shown that the transaction costs of hiring labor in family farms covered three types:foreseeing,negotiating,and verifying.Four main types of risks were identified:lack of labor rights protection,non-professionalization,opportunistic behavior,and labor conflicts.For productive labor,fixed working hour and task-based contracting mechanisms were recommended;for technical labor,performance-based profit-sharing and risk-sharing mechanisms with deeply tied interests were recommended;for managerial labor,human capital equity participation and trust mechanisms were suggested.Complementary and differentiated governance models,combining formal contracts and relational contracts,should be adopted according to different employment contexts.Recommendations were proposed,including strengthening standardized contract management and improving the supply of agricultural employment institutions and standards.关键词
家庭农场/雇工合约/缔约成本/履约风险/合约治理Key words
family farms/employment contracts/transaction costs/contract performance risks/contract governance分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
陈军民..家庭农场雇工合约的缔结成本、履约风险与治理策略[J].沈阳大学学报（社会科学版）,2026,28(4):15-23,9.基金项目
河南省哲学社会科学规划项目(2025ZDI05) （2025ZDI05）
河南省科技厅软科学项目(262400410306). （262400410306）
