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证券虚假陈述的危险信号理论OACHSSCDCSTPCD

中文摘要英文摘要

在我国证券法上,危险信号开始被用来论证证券虚假陈述的有关责任人未勤勉尽责.危险信号理论的引入,有助于优化签字即担责的执法逻辑,科学精准地打击违法者,但我国对该理论的运用尚处于起步阶段.美国证券法上运用危险信号理论的司法实践有助于我们更好地判断危险信号,提升危险信号理论的确定性和可预期性.危险信号虽因场景而异,甚至因人而异,但也有一定的边界,其应是发行人自身发生的一项具体事实,需具有警示性,需与被告的主观过错直接相关,并需达到一定的金额或比例.危险信号也是一把双刃剑,既可以用来论证被告未勤勉尽责,也可能因其已被发行人主动披露而导致不够审慎的投资者败诉.

In China's securities law,red flags are beginning to be used to demonstrate that the party responsible for a securities misrepresentation fails to fulfill the duty of diligence.The introduction of red flags theory helps to optimize the logic of signature-as-liability enforcement and cracks down on violators with scientific precision.However,the application of the red flags theory is still in the preliminary stage in China.The judicial practice of applying the red flags theory in the US securities law helps us better determine red flags and enhances the certainty and predictability of the red flags theory.Although red flags may vary from scenario to scenario and even from person to person,they have certain boundaries.Red flags should be a specific fact that occurs in the issuer's own company,have warning significance,be directly related to the defendant's subjective fault,and reach a certain amount or proportion.Red flags are also a double-edged sword that can not only be used to argue that the defendant fails to exercise the duty of diligence but also be used to defeat less prudent investors who have been voluntarily disclosed by the issuer.

邢会强

中央财经大学法学院,北京 100081

政治法律

危险信号信息披露虚假陈述勤勉义务过错推定

red flagsinformation disclosuremisrepresentationduty of diligencepresumption of fault

《证券市场导报》 2024 (001)

16-25,50 / 11

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