证券市场导报Issue(1)：26-38,13.
并购业绩承诺与企业精准扶贫
摘要
Abstract
As the key content of social responsibility with Chinese characteristics,targeted poverty alleviation(TPA)embodies the important spirit of sustainable corporate development.However,performance commitments in M&A contexts may induce or even exacerbate management's pursuit of short-term performance targets.Using the sample of China's A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2021,this study examines the impact of performance commitments in M&A on corporate TPA practices.We find that entering into M&A performance commitments can significantly inhibit corporate engagement in TPA by increasing performance pressure and agency costs.External supervision entities including institutional investors,media,and analysts have an asymmetric impact on this relationship.Institutional investor ownership and media coverage would mitigate the adverse impact of performance commitments,whereas analyst attention exacerbates this negative relationship.Additionally,both overstated and non-overstated performance commitments negatively affect corporate TPA.The nature of enterprise property and the fulfillment of performance commitments lead to heterogeneous effects on corporate TPA practices.This study has important reference significance for improving the regulation of performance commitments,enhancing corporate TPA,and strengthening external supervision mechanisms.关键词
并购/业绩承诺/企业精准扶贫/外部监督/非对称影响Key words
M&A/performance commitments/corporate targeted poverty alleviation/external supervision/asymmetric impact分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
张俊瑞,曹泽勇,宋沛欣..并购业绩承诺与企业精准扶贫[J].证券市场导报,2024,(1):26-38,13.基金项目
国家自然科学基金面上项目"资本市场全面开放,机构投资者网络与前瞻性信息披露:影响路径与经济后果研究"(项目编号:72072143)、国家社会科学基金重大项目"数据资产会计标准构建与应用研究"(项目编号:23&ZD092)、国家社会科学基金后期资助重点项目"会计准则研究"(项目编号:20FGLA005) （项目编号:72072143）
