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考虑灵活调节需求的容量市场出清模型与定价方法OA北大核心CSTPCD

Clearing Model and Pricing Method for Capacity Market Considering Flexible Regulation Requirement

中文摘要英文摘要

新能源占比的提升使得电力系统对灵活调节资源的需求显著增加,而传统容量市场仅以保障负荷峰值时段的系统充裕度为目标,仍可能存在因灵活调节能力不足而导致电力供应短缺的情况.为此,提出考虑灵活调节需求的容量市场鲁棒优化出清模型与定价方法,给出不同类型资源的结算规则,并验证所提出的容量市场机制能够满足社会效率、收支平衡、个体理性、激励相容等性质.最后,采用IEEE 118节点系统进行算例验证.结果表明,所提出的容量市场机制能够同时保障负荷峰值时段系统充裕度与灵活调节能力的充裕度,合理刻画灵活调节资源的容量价值,有效区分不同类型资源的有效容量贡献与引起灵活调节需求的责任,有助于引导新能源机组平抑出力不确定性波动,激励灵活性资源提供容量满足系统灵活调节需求.

The increase in the proportion of renewable energy has led to a significant increase in the requirement for flexible regulation resources in the power system.However,the traditional capacity market only aims to guarantee the system adequacy during the peak load period.There may still be a shortage of power supply due to insufficient flexible regulation capacity.Therefore,this paper proposes a robust optimal clearing model and a pricing method for the capacity market that considers the flexible regulation requirement.The settlement rules for different resource types are provided.And it is verified that the proposed capacity market pricing mechanism can satisfy the properties of social efficiency,balance of payments,individual rationality,and incentive compatibility.Finally,the IEEE 118-bus system is used for the case study.The results show that the proposed capacity market mechanism can simultaneously guarantee the adequacy of the system to cope with peak load and flexible regulation requirement,reasonably describe the capacity value of flexible regulation resources,and effectively distinguish between the effective capacity contribution of different types of resources and the responsibility of causing flexible regulation requirement,which helps to guide renewable energy units to suppress their output uncertainty fluctuations and incentivize flexible resources to provide capacity to meet system flexible regulation requirement.

瞿颖;肖云鹏;张臣;王秀丽

西安交通大学电气工程学院,陕西省西安市 710049

容量市场电力系统灵活性定价机制鲁棒优化激励相容

capacity marketpower system flexibilitypricing mechanismrobust optimizationincentive compatibility

《电力系统自动化》 2024 (011)

64-76 / 13

国家重点研发计划资助项目(2022YFB2403200). This work is supported by National Key R&D Program of China(No.2022YFB2403200).

10.7500/AEPS20230206005

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