电力系统保护与控制2024，Vol.52Issue(13)：13-24,12.DOI:10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.231673
不对称信息下新型储能容量租赁市场的博弈均衡分析
Game equilibrium analysis of energy storage leasing market with asymmetric information
摘要
Abstract
Energy storage capacity leasing is becoming a new business model.It has received a lot of attention because of its low risk and high flexibility.To sovle the problem of energy storage capacity leasing between an independent energy storage operator and multiple prosumers who can simultaneously produce and consume energy in an energy community under asymmetric cost information,first,asymmetric information is transformed into complete information via the Harsanyi transformation.Second,a two-stage extensive game model between the energy storage operator and the prosumers is established.Third,market clearing and settlement rules based on a uniform price mechanism are designed.Finally,the subgame refinement Nash equilibrium of the extensive game with complete information between the operator and the prosumers under the uniform price mechanism is analyzed,and the existence of the equilibrium is proved by the Brouwer fixed point theorem.Simulation studies show that energy storage capacity leasing can significantly reduce the electricity cost of the prosumers and improve the efficiency of energy storage utilization.The game equilibrium of the uniform price mechanism is superior to that of the discriminatory price mechanism in finding fair energy storage capacity leasing prices,increasing the profits of the independent energy storage operator,increasing the scale of energy storage capacity transactions,and improving social welfare.关键词
储能租赁/产消者/不对称信息/扩展式博弈/子博弈精炼纳什均衡Key words
energy storage leasing/prosumers/asymmetric information/extensive game/subgame perfect Nash equilibrium引用本文复制引用
徐爽,万靖,崔世常,方仍存,文劲宇..不对称信息下新型储能容量租赁市场的博弈均衡分析[J].电力系统保护与控制,2024,52(13):13-24,12.基金项目
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52207108). 国家自然科学基金项目资助(52207108) （No.52207108）
国网湖北省电力有限公司科技项目资助(B31538238124) （B31538238124）
