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基于博弈竞价的区域综合能源系统运营弹性增强策略OA北大核心CSTPCD

Enhancing operational resilience of regional integrated energy systems via a game-based bidding strategy

中文摘要英文摘要

能源系统故障可能导致巨大的经济损失,因此,提升能源系统的运营弹性具有重要意义.为了提高区域综合能源系统在市场机制下的弹性,本文提出了一种基于博弈的能源竞标策略.首先,建立了区域综合能源系统模型,其中包括能源控制中心、能源枢纽、储能系统和用户聚合商.为了在市场环境下通过价格引导弹性增强,构建了基于Stackelberg博弈的能源竞标框架,通过调整能源零售价格和需求响应激励价格等策略,以减小能源缺口并降低价格波动.考虑到参与者间的隐私保护,设计了双层迭代定价算法.最后,通过仿真算例说明了所提策略在保证供需平衡的同时有效抑制价格波动,从而降低经济损失.

Energy system outages can lead to huge economic losses,so it is important to enhance the operational resilience of energy systems.To improve the resilience of regional integrated energy systems(RIESs)operated in market mechanism,this paper proposes a game-based energies bidding strategy.A RIES consisting of an energy control center(ECC),an energy hub(EH),a battery energy storage system(ESS)and a user aggregator(UA)is modelled.In order to enhance the resilience of RIESs through a pricing mechanism,a Stackelberg game-based energies bidding framework are designed beyond the RIES model.By adjusting retail prices and incentive price,energy imbalance is eliminated and price fluctuation is reduced.Furthermore,a bi-level iterative bidding algorithm is developed to protect privacy and reduce computational burden.Finally,numerical results are given to illustrate that the proposed strategy can suppress prices fluctuation while maintaining energy balance.

陈翼;邹媛媛;李少远

上海交通大学电子信息与电气工程学院自动化系,上海 200240

区域综合能源系统弹性增强Stackelberg博弈

regional integrated energy systemresilience enhancementStackelberg game

《控制理论与应用》 2024 (007)

1216-1224 / 9

国家自然科学基金项目(62173224)资助.Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(62173224).

10.7641/CTA.2024.30543

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