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监管不确定性与审计决策——基于审计收费的证据OA北大核心CSSCICSTPCD

Regulatory Uncertainty and Auditing Choice:Evidence Based on Audit Fees

中文摘要英文摘要

以2012~2021年沪深A股上市公司为样本,基于证监会换届的准自然实验,研究了历届证监会新任主席在其上任之初因监管风格差异造成的监管不确定性对审计师决策的影响.研究发现:监管不确定性较高时,审计师会显著增加上市公司的审计收费,以弥补审计成本并对冲执业风险;审计师为应对审计风险上升而加大审计投入是导致该效应的重要途径.进一步研究表明,审计师行业专长越高、公司过往无财务违规、存在市场化监管预期时,监管不确定性对审计决策的影响更为显著.本文对降低监管不确定性、提高上市公司盈余质量、稳定审计收费等具有启发意义.

Utilizing the data of A-share listed firms from 2012 to 2021,this paper investigates the effect of regulatory uncertainty caused by differences in regulatory styles on auditor choice by new chairpersons of the China Securities Regulation Commission(CSRC)at the beginning of their tenure,based on a quasi-natural experiment of leadership transition of CSRC.The empirical evidence shows that facing a high regulatory uncertainty,auditors will claim higher audit fees to cover the audit costs and hedge the practice risks.The rise in audit risk is an important mechanism to cause this effect,that is,regulatory uncertainty will significantly increase audit risk,thereby leading to a greater audit input and higher audit fees.Further analysis shows that the higher the expertise of auditors in the industry,the more significant the impact of regulatory uncertainty on audit decisions when the company has no past financial violations,and there are expectations for market-oriented regulation.This paper has enlightening significance for reducing regulatory uncertainty,improving the earnings quality of listed companies,and stabilizing audit fees.

徐晓东;叶子繁

上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海 200030中国银行股份有限公司,北京 100818

经济学

监管不确定性审计决策证监会换届

regulatory uncertaintyauditor choicechanges of the chairman of China Securities Regulation Commission(CSRC)

《系统管理学报》 2024 (004)

1086-1099 / 14

国家自然科学基金资助项目(72372103)

10.3969/j.issn2097-4558.2024.04.017

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