证券市场导报Issue(7)：28-40,13.
媒体报道如何影响并购重组知情交易:合流还是监督?
摘要
Abstract
Media coverage can either play a positive external supervisory role in constraining informed trading or be manipulated and exploited by informed traders.This study examines the impact of pre-announcement negative media coverage tendency on the extent of informed trading in mergers and acquisitions using the collected data on mergers and acquisitions of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2022.The result reveals that the higher the tendency for negative media coverage before the first announcement of mergers and acquisitions,the lower the extent of informed trading.Media exerts its governance role by increasing litigation risk and through the reputation channel.Further analysis shows that a favorable corporate governance environment can strengthen the impact of negative media coverage tendency on informed trading,whereas the governance function of media is weakened in state-owned enterprises.Pre-announcement analyst forecasts increase the overall level of informed trading in the market and undermine the function of media.Among different types of media,online media demonstrate a greater constraining effect on informed trading compared to print media.Moreover,the inhibitory effect of media on informed trading wanes after 480 days.This research provides insights for leveraging the supervisory role of media,improving the regulatory efficiency of informed trading,protecting investors'legitimate interests,and maintaining fairness in the capital market.关键词
媒体报道/知情交易/并购重组/诉讼风险Key words
media coverage/informed trading/mergers and acquisitions/litigation risk分类
管理科学引用本文复制引用
许荣,冯荟凝,方明浩..媒体报道如何影响并购重组知情交易:合流还是监督?[J].证券市场导报,2024,(7):28-40,13.基金项目
国家资助博士后研究人员计划(批准号:GZC20231523)、国家自然科学基金专项"助力可持续发展的金融市场建模分析"(批准号:72342021)、教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目"中国特色多层次贫困治理与保险保障体系研究"(批准号:22JJD790089) （批准号:GZC20231523）
