媒体报道如何影响并购重组知情交易:合流还是监督?OA北大核心CHSSCDCSSCICSTPCD

Media coverage can either play a positive external supervisory role in constraining informed trading or be manipulated and exploited by informed traders.This study examines the impact of pre-announcement negative media coverage tendency on the extent of informed trading in mergers and acquisitions using the collected data on mergers and acquisitions of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2022.The result reveals that the higher the tendency for negative media coverage before the first announcement of mergers and acquisitions,the lower the extent of informed trading.Media exerts its governance role by increasing litigation risk and through the reputation channel.Further analysis shows that a favorable corporate governance environment can strengthen the impact of negative media coverage tendency on informed trading,whereas the governance function of media is weakened in state-owned enterprises.Pre-announcement analyst forecasts increase the overall level of informed trading in the market and undermine the function of media.Among different types of media,online media demonstrate a greater constraining effect on informed trading compared to print media.Moreover,the inhibitory effect of media on informed trading wanes after 480 days.This research provides insights for leveraging the supervisory role of media,improving the regulatory efficiency of informed trading,protecting investors'legitimate interests,and maintaining fairness in the capital market.