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考虑设备保护的租赁制造系统生产决策与收益调整激励机制OACHSSCDCSTPCD

Production Decisions and Revenue Adjustment Incentive Mechanisms in Leased Manufacturing Systems Considering Equipment Protection

中文摘要英文摘要

针对租赁设备合作生产过程中可能会出现承租方滥用设备的现象,提出一种考虑设备保护的租赁制造系统生产决策模型与收益调整激励机制,以形成租赁制造的最优生产策略.从设备保护的角度出发,构建考虑承租方对租赁设备使用率和保护程度的优化模型,以租赁制造系统总收益最大化为目标,确定设备保护的努力程度、设备使用率以及维护后设备状态与如新状态偏差度,即租赁制造系统的最优生产策略.提出一套收益调整激励机制,运用补偿金对合作双方的收益进行调整,并令双方独立决策的最优策略与系统最优策略相同,得到最佳补偿金系数,从而确定收益调整方案.案例研究表明,系统决策模型存在使得总收益最大的最优努力程度和预防维护程度,且系统决策下的最大总收益总是高于独立决策下的最大总收益,提升承租方对设备保护的努力程度和出租方对设备的预防程度,可以减少租赁设备平均故障次数.

To address the potential issue of lessees abusing equipment during cooperative production in leased manu-facturing systems,a production decision-making model and an incentive mechanism of revenue adjustment are proposed considering equipment protection to develop the optimal production strategy.From the perspective of equipment protection,an optimization model is developed considering the usage rate and protection degree of the leased equipment by lessees with the objective of maximizing the total revenue of the leased manufacturing system.The model determines the optimal production strategy by defining the effort degree of equipment protection,the equipment usage rate and the state deviation between a new equipment and the equipment after maintenance.Then,an incentive mechanism about revenue adjustment is proposed using compensation to adjust the revenue of both parties.The mechanism ensures that the optimal strategy for independent decision of each party align with the systematic optimal strategy.In this way,the best compensation coefficient is determined and the revenue adjustment plan is developed.Case study shows that the system decision-making model identifies the optimal effort degree and preventive maintenance degree that maximize the total revenue.Additionally,the maximum total revenue obtained by the system decision model is always higher than that with independent decisions.Moreover,increasing lessee efforts in equipment protection and lessor preventive maintenance can reduce the average number of failures of leased equipment.

李亚平;吴尽;程宇虹;陶良彦;刘思峰

南京林业大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 210037南京航空航天大学 灰色系统研究所,江苏 南京 210016南京航空航天大学 灰色系统研究所,江苏 南京 210016||西北工业大学 管理学院,陕西 西安,710072

经济学

租赁制造系统生产决策设备保护收益调整

leased manufacturing systemproduction decisionsequipment protectionrevenue adjustment

《工业工程》 2024 (004)

29-38,101 / 11

国家自然科学基金资助项目(72171120,72071111);江苏高校"青蓝工程"资助项目(2021)

10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.240066

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