基于订单农业的农产品供应链帮扶策略研究OACHSSCDCSTPCD
Supporting Strategies of Agricultural Supply Chains Based on Contract Farming
为了研究政府及零售商的农产品供应链帮扶决策,考虑政府生产性补贴和零售商投入的扶贫努力,建立 3种订单农业帮扶模型,包括政府补贴模型(GS模型)、零售商扶贫模型(RH模型)、政府与零售商联合帮扶模型(GR模型).通过对 3种模型中各主体利润关系及利润增量的对比分析,得到政府及零售商的最优帮扶决策.结果表明,政府仅为高成本农户提供生产性补贴之后,零售商有必要为其投入扶贫努力;零售商为所有农户投入扶贫努力之后,政府有必要再提供生产性补贴.零售商的扶贫助农计划可以始终惠及所有农户,而在消费者强敏感市场下,政府后期提供补贴可以惠及所有农户.此外,在消费者弱敏感市场下需要政府先补贴,零售商后投入扶贫努力;在消费者强敏感市场下需要零售商先投入扶贫努力,然后政府再补贴.
In order to study the supply chain support decisions of the government and retailers for agricultural products,three contract farming support models are established considering government production subsidies and retailer investment in poverty alleviation efforts,including the government subsidy model(GS model),the retailer poverty alleviation model(RH model),and the government-retailer joint support model(GR model).Through the comparative analysis of profit relationships and profit increment of each party in the three models,the optimal support decisions of the government and retailers are obtained.Results show that if the government provides production subsidies only to high-cost farmers,it is necessary for retailers to devote poverty alleviation efforts.Conversely,if retailers invest in poverty alleviation efforts for all farmers,the government should then provide production subsidies.Retailers poverty alleviation programs can consistently benefit all farmers.In a consumer-sensitive market,government subsidies provided later can benefit all farmers.In addition,in a market with low consumer sensitivity,the government needs to subsidize first,followed by retailer investment in poverty alleviation efforts.In a consumer-sensitive market,retailers are required to invest in poverty alleviation efforts first,followed by government subsidies.
冯春;颜菁;何征;冯宇杰
西南交通大学 交通运输与物流学院,四川 成都 610031||西南交通大学 综合交通大数据应用技术国家工程实验室,四川 成都 610031西南交通大学 交通运输与物流学院,四川 成都 610031
经济学
Stackelberg博弈政府补贴零售商扶贫努力企业社会责任
Stackelberg gamegovernment subsidiesretailer poverty alleviation effortscorporate social responsibility
《工业工程》 2024 (004)
70-81 / 12
国家社会科学基金资助项目(17BGL085)
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